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resuMen
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Tradicionalmente o aborto na Colômbia tem sido um tema sensível e bastante controvertido no cenário público. Ainda que a 
Corte Constitucional descriminalizou o aborto em 2006 em três circunstâncias específi cas, a sociedade colombiana permanece 
polarizada ao redor da moralidade do aborto. Entretanto, esta decisão da Corte é uma oportunidade para ver como ética, política 
e direito podem ser em verdade combinados. De fato, diferencia cada campo e reconhece suas posibilidades pode ser a chave 
para conviver pacifi camente, inclusive ainda que nas últimas os desacordos éticos não podem resolver-se completamente. 
Abortion has traditionally been a deeply controversial and sensitive public issue in Colombia. Although the Constitutional Court decri-
minalised abortion in 2006 in three specifi c circumstances, Colombian society is still polarized around the morality of abortion. However, 
the Court’s decision is an opportunity to see how ethics, politics, and law can be rightly combined. Indeed, to differentiate each fi eld and 
to recognize their possibilities may be the key to coexisting peacefully even if ethical disagreements cannot be completely solved.
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Tradicionalmente el aborto en Colombia ha sido un tema sensible y bastante controvertido en el escenario público. Aunque 
la Corte Constitucional descriminalizó el aborto en 2006 en tres circunstancias específi cas, la sociedad colombiana permanece 
polarizada alrededor de la moralidad del aborto. Sin embargo, esta decisión de la Corte es una oportunidad para ver como ética, 
política y derecho pueden ser en verdad combinados. De hecho, diferenciar cada campo y reconocer sus posibilidades puede ser 
la llave para convivir pacífi camente, incluso aunque en últimas los desacuerdos éticos no puedan resolverse completamente.
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IntroductIon
The second half of the 20th century was characterized 
by “the ethics of biotechnology”. In fact, the emergence of 
biomedicine seems to have given a new life to ethics (Toul-
min, 1982). As soon as biomedicine started to intervene in 
life and the human body by modifying, manipulating, and 
controlling it, new ethical questions arose. At present, em-
bryonic stem cells, human-animal hybrids, human cloning, 
and so on are some of the topics that are regarded in both 
academic and media circles as “ethically debatable”.1
However, not only are new technologies challenging 
to ethics, but old issues continue to be a social concern. 
Abortion, for example, remains an ethically unsolvable di-
lemma and it is a “classical” topic of any text of bioeth-
ics2 (Oderberg, 2000). The ethical debate around abortion 
is important and interesting because it can be taken as a 
case-model to bring to light the dimensions of current bio-
ethical debates as a whole. It effectively mirrors the extent 
to which living in a pluralistic and multicultural society has 
become a central challenge to ethics. 
In this paper I shall argue that abortion is fundamen-
tally a “practical” problem, that is, a situation where 
the question “what should I do?” requires a concrete 
answer. This question emphasises the practical nature 
of abortion and is intended as a counter balance to 
the trend that has emerged for papers to discuss the 
issue in too abstract way and without reference to a particu-
lar reality. The rhetoric of the ethical discussion usually lies 
in the intrinsic logic of the contended arguments. However, 
abortion is about the making of practical decisions which 
therefore necessitates more than just building abstract of 
arguments. While many people spend their time and en-
ergies trying to convince others that their arguments are 
“true”, everyday doctors and women have to make practi-
cal decisions regarding abortion that involve not only socio-
political institutions but also and legal rules. 
In the first part, I will show that abortion has been a fact 
in history and the current ethical discussion is completely 
polarized. Then, following an Aristotelian/Kantian approach, I 
suggest that we need to “remember” that practical prob-
lems have to be solved not only by appealing to ethical argu-
ments, but also by implementing political actions and stating 
legal boundaries. All of this is according to the requirements 
and nature of a pluralistic society. Ethics, Politics and Law 
constitute one field, a continuum, the practical philosophy 
(Kant, 1996). Ethics is not the only criterion to orientate 
human action in a society, it is also necessary to include 
politics and law. By using ethical, political and legal criteria 
we might be in a better position to manage those inexorable 
situations in human life when decisions about what should 
be done are unavoidable . However, admitting the useful role 
that politics and law can play in dealing with ethical disagree-
ments requires prior understanding of the aporia3 that con-
temporary ethical discussion represents. In the last part, I 
shall comment that the recent process of decriminalisation 
of abortion in Colombia illustrates how politics and law effec-
tively mediate between endless ethical “arguments” about 
abortion and the practical solution that it requires. 
BrIef hIstory of aBortIon
There is no space here to give a complete history of 
abortion, but it is worth outlining the key developments in 
order to give background to the current ethical debates. 
Abortion is as old as the history of humankind. There are re-
ports of induced abortions in China dating back -5000 years. 
In the Hippocratic Oath, 4th century BC, there is a clause 
prohibiting physicians from giving pessaries to women who 
wanted to abort (Hippocrates, 1995). Some have interpret-
ed this passage as a ban on abortion, while others underline 
that what was really forbidden were pessaries themselves 
as they could produce vaginal ulcers (Riddle, 1991). In fact, 
physicians were “free to employ contraceptives, oral abor-
tifacients, and the various surgical and manipulative proce-
dures available” (Riddle, 1997: 9). 
For centuries –in particular, before the 17th century- abor-
tion was mainly a “woman’s issue” rather than a medical or 
a political one. Because of the limited development of medi-
cal knowledge and techniques, it is possible that finding an 
effective method was a greater concern to women than the 
ethical implications of ending pregnancy. However, in the 
public arena ethics has occupied a prominent place and it is 
here where hostile positions to abortion usually collide with 
the sympathetic ones. Nonetheless, there has always been 
room for some degree of ethical debate about its acceptabil-
ity. The Augustinian doctrine, for example, was for long time 
a criterion to decide when an abortion could be allowed. Ac-
cording to this doctrine, abortion practised before the “quick-
ening” time4, which was identified as the moment of ensoul-
ment, was not forbidden. The strong opposition to abortion 
started when the Catholic Church declared in the sixteenth 
century that abortion was a crime (Rothman, 1997: 104f).
During the nineteenth century abortion began to be crimi-
nalized in several European countries and in the United States. 
In 1869 Pope Pius IX declared that under any circumstances 
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abortion was a mortal sin. As it was considered that there 
were no dramatic qualitative changes throughout foetal de-
velopment, “the focus of discussion became the gravity of 
the offense of killing a [foetus], whatever its developmental 
period” (Riddle, 1997: 213). Also in this century, the meaning 
of pregnancy shifted; having been traditionally a “woman’s 
issue”, it became a matter of medical intervention. 
By 1818 the French physician Théophile-René-Hya-
cinthe Laennec introduced the stethoscope, a medical 
device that eventually gave doctors the possibility of hear-
ing the foetal cardiac beats. Today, doctors have come to 
be seen as the “natural and indisputable” advocates of 
pregnancy. No sooner was pregnancy medicalised than 
abortion also became medicalised. This has been an im-
portant circumstance since the concept of medically indi-
cated procedure works as a widely accepted ethical argu-
ment to justify abortion (Hull, & Hoffer, 2001: 57) 
By contrast, during the second half of the 20th century 
there was a wave of legalisation in several countries. It was 
not until the 1960’s that legal rights to access safe and quali-
fied medical services for abortion were truly real in Britain 
and the United States. In the former it was in 1967, through 
the Abortion Act, and in the latter in 1973, as a result of Roe 
v. Wade. Nowadays, abortion is legal in many countries, al-
though the degree to which a country permits it can widely 
vary5. In Latin America one of the most recent cases of legal-
ization of abortion is Colombia in 2006, which epitomizes an 
interesting case where ethics, law and politics overlapped.
the current ethIcal deBate aBout aBortIon
The moral concern about abortion has been so huge 
in the United States, that some have argued it is “the 
prime contemporary problem of public morals” (Reagan, 
1986: 100). R. Dworkin has said that the abortion debate 
is “America’s new version of the terrible seventeenth-cen-
tury European civil wars of religion” (quoted in Boyle, 
1997: 1). Despite its legalization in the 1970s, the ethical 
debate shows no signs of abating. In the United Kingdom, 
where abortion was legalized in 1967, a parliamentary proj-
ect to reform the Abortion Act recently failed.6 In the of-
ficial doctrine of major religions, for example, the Catholic 
Church and Islam, abortion is still condemned as a form of 
crime against human life and, frequently, against a human 
person (Pope John Paul II, 1995; Hedayat, 2006)7. 
The main strands of this moral debate consist of two 
incompatible and completely opposed positions. On the 
one hand, there is the Pro-life position which underlines 
that abortion is morally wrong because it is simply murder. 
On the other hand, the Pro-choice position emphasises 
that abortion is “optional” for women. Between these 
two extreme positions there is middle ground which advo-
cates that abortion can be morally justified in some cases. 
In fact, for some, the very problem of this moral debate 
about abortion is that it is necessary to be aligned with 
one extreme or the other. The major problem of extreme 
positions is that their activism has contributed to a state of 
“warfare” in the debate over abortion (Solinger, 1998). On 
the whole, while the pro-life position appeals to the moral 
status of the foetus to account for why abortion is murder, 
the pro-choice position stresses women’s rights and the 
freedom to justify terminating the pregnancy.8
If an entity has a moral status, it means that it is mor-
ally considerable or it has moral standing. Once this is es-
tablished, moral agents have moral obligations to such an 
entity (Warren, M. A., 1997: 3). Thus, the pro-life position 
puts emphasis on the humanity of the embryo/foetus to 
derive from it an obligation to respect its life in the same 
way that we would do with any adult human being. The anti-
abortion argument has shifted its focus, from the 
woman to the product of conception. Our so-
ciety seems to have a cultural fascination with 
the foetus (Rothman, 1997: 106f). In contrast, 
the pro-choice position shortens the scope of 
moral status to include morally considerable en-
tities. Thus, for the pro-choice view, the moral status of the 
embryo/foetus should be derived from personhood which 
implies the presence of mental features such as self-con-
sciousness or a minimum level of ability to have human feel-
ings (Engelhardt, 1995: 170). In this way, even during the 
first months of extra-uterine life, human beings might not 
be considered fully persons. The lack of personhood would 
make abortion permissible in the pro-choicers’ view. 
Moreover, the moral debate about abortion can also be 
understood in terms of the ethical theories which are used 
to support or condemn it. In this debate, there are four kinds 
of ethical approaches: consequentialism, deontology, virtue 
ethics and the American bioethics with its four principles9. 
While consequentialist –or utilitarian- theories require that 
our actions promote the best consequences (Baron, 2006: 
213), deontological theories would consider an action as 
right if it is in accordance with a moral rule or principle, for 
example, by treating every human being “always as an end 
and never as a means only to an end” (Kant, 2005). In the 
virtue ethics the question is to behave virtuously, defining 
virtue as “a character trait a human being needs to flourish 
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or live well” (Hursthouse, 1991: 224). In the case of the 
American bioethics the ethically right action is the result of 
both specifying and balancing the four prima facie principles 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2001: 15). 
Giving arguments either for or against abortion seems 
to be something that depends less on the rightness or 
wrongness of a theory than on the purposes, intentions or 
beliefs of the people involved in the discussion. Interest-
ingly, arguments for or against abortion might be suitably 
derived from a single theory. The only difference would be 
the ideological commitments of those who provide either 
one argument or another. For example, we might imag-
ine a consequentialist pro-life argument as well as a pro-
choice one. In the first case, one may argue that if to live 
is a positive value and to die is a negative one, therefore 
the best consequence is to promote the birth of human 
beings and to avoid their death. In the second case, the 
pro-choice position, it can be argued that the fundamental 
value of human life is freedom. Therefore, promoting life at 
the expense of the woman’s freedom could be seen as a 
worse consequence than losing an “incipient” life which 
we do not recognize has having such a property. 
Notice that in both cases there are pre-assumptions: in 
the first position, the premise is that life is the most impor-
tant value while in the second it is freedom. Participants in 
an ethical discussion might at the same time be members 
of particular moral communities that express different world-
views. Then, if participants belong to different moral worlds, 
to achieve an agreement on fundamental rules, principles, 
consequences or virtues would be almost impossible. 
Unless people take into account the opportunities offered 
by politics and law to regulate social life, ethical disagree-
ments will remain as an aporia. There is a contention be-
tween the alleged universalism of many ethical arguments 
and the inescapable contextual situation where decisions 
about abortion take place. This situation leads us to examine 
more carefully the nature of contemporary ethics arena. 
the conteMporary ethIcs scenarIo: an aporIa?
Since Aristotle we have noticed that ethics is neither 
the only source of knowledge nor the only tool to lead our 
lives. In his Nichomaquean Ethics, Aristotle claimed that 
achieving a good life went hand in hand with the correct 
administration of the polis’ life (Reeve, 1992). Exercising 
virtues is something that depends on the existence of a 
just society. Indeed, he bridges the gap between Ethics 
and Politics since it might be said that politics works as the 
It was not until the decade 
of the 1960’s that legal 
rights to access safe and 
qualified medical services 
of abortion were truly real 
in Britain and the United 
States. In the former it was 
in 1967, through the Abor-
tion Act, and in the latter in 
1973, as a result of the case 
Roe v. Wade. Nowadays, 
abortion is legal in many 
countries, although the 
degree to which a country 
permits it can widely vary. 
In Latin America one of the 
most recent cases of le-
galization of abortion is Co-
lombia in 2006, which epit-
omizes an interesting case 
where ethics, law and poli-
tics overlapped.
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“ethics of the collective” (Fernandez, 2002). Additionally, 
the concept of practical philosophy was coined after Kant 
to name a field which embraces ethics, politics, and law 
(Kant, 1996). By appealing to practical philosophy one can 
argue that any solution to a normative question requires 
not only ethics but also politics and law. This claim is not 
merely rhetoric. It is, hopefully, the turning point that will 
let us find a practical solution to the theoretically endless 
moral debate about abortion. As soon as we deal with 
human problems related to the question what should I 
do?, this question is, in principle, a practical one and has 
to be solved by working on ethics, politics, and law. Pure 
ethical dilemmas exist only as abstractions. 
When substantial matters of ethics are debated, people 
usually listen to God or argue in different ways (Engelhardt, 
1995: 21). For every argument supporting one ethical posi-
tion there is another to attack it; for every “true” god there 
is another one. Thus, ethical positions are usually incompat-
ible and incommensurable (MacIntyre, 1990). Abortion is 
an excellent example of this situation, “the stridency of the 
abortion debate marks the strength of such disagreements. 
Some regard abortion as profoundly morally evil […], while 
others see it as at most a physical evil. The abortion debate 
is only one of a number of issues where the controver-
sies are both impassioned and reflect well-entrenched and 
conflicting moral visions” (Engelhardt, 1996: 8). As already 
mentioned, particular kinds of ethics work well in particular 
communities. Those who share a similar ethical perspective 
–similar ideas about what rightness/wrongness and worth-
while/worthless mean- can be seen as moral friends. Moral 
controversies are easier to solve among moral friends than 
among moral strangers, those who belong to different moral 
worlds10. Our societies in the Western world are made up of 
diverse moral communities, that is, they are plural and mul-
ticultural societies where moral strangeness is sometimes 
more common than moral familiarity. 
As it is easy to see, the main challenge is to resolve 
ethical conflicts among moral strangers rather than among 
moral friends. For this, contemporary ethics has stressed 
two aspects: firstly, the consent of the individual11 as the 
source of moral authority and, secondly, the emphasis on a 
just procedure rather than on true content. In other words, 
contemporary society is more concerned about how indi-
viduals make agreements rather than what kinds of truths 
they believe in. The challenge in a pluralistic society is to 
find a common source of moral authority but, as it has been 
shown, this is difficult in the context of diverse rational ar-
guments and different faiths. Thus, the possibility of solving 
ethical differences between moral strangers seems to rest 
on making basic rules which assure nonviolent coexistence 
despite those substantive ethical differences. 
These basic rules are expressed in terms of political 
solutions and legal commitments. Here, the central issue 
will not be the content of any of those particular ethical 
perspectives in dispute, but the procedure used by the 
participants (moral strangers) to agree the rules of living. 
This procedure has to be just, that is, each ethical position 
will be expressed and as respected as any other. After 
this act of “listening”, ethical disagreements will be man-
ageable through a political and legal consensus, which 
implies that individuals have agreed some rules of living 
while ethical differences are respected (Habermas, 1990). 
At the macrolevel, a fundamental agreement about those 
rules of living is usually expressed in terms of political 
constitutions enacted by each country. At the microlevel, 
we find the example of ethical committees, which are po-
litical bodies created in health care institutions and whose 
aim is to achieve a consensus around an ethical dilemma. 
In these committees ethical disagreements are solved 
through two strategies: first, by implementing a dialogue 
based on the moral use of the practical reason12 and, 
second, by seeking to make agreements on what 
should be done. The striving ethical perspectives 
are discussed in terms of having an agree-
ment, not exclusively in terms of examining 
the internal consistency of the arguments.
If ethics is a polysemantic world that leads 
to disagreements, then politics and law would 
represent the common language which can be spoken 
among moral strangers to solve their differences. Some 
might argue that the moral permissibility of abortion is not 
a synonym with its legal permissibility, but there are legal 
tools that can be helpful when the discussion is bogged 
down in ethical issues. This paper is not concerned with 
finding the best ethical argument or theory to resolve the 
abortion debate. It is not about a meta-ethical perspective. 
Instead, it is about a normative question, what should I 
do? This fundamental question requires a practical answer. 
It means that we are not only moral members of society 
but also political ones. Although people might belong to 
different moral communities, they share common politico-
legal ties because of citizenship13. The recent case of de-
criminalisation of abortion in Colombia can be understood 
as an attempt to appeal to this politico-legal shared condi-
tion so that citizens with different ethical perspectives can 
peacefully live together in the same society. 
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the case of coloMBIa
In April 2006 the Colombian Con-
stitutional Court decriminalised abor-
tion in three specific cases: 1) the 
pregnancy constitutes a serious 
threat to the pregnant woman’s life 
or health; 2) the foetus has severe 
malformations; and 3) the preg-
nancy is the result of rape or incest 
(Corte Constitucional, 2006). It was 
an historical decision since at least 
five bills for enacting a law that 
guarantees legal and safe abortion 
services had been presented but 
rejected in the Parliament since the 
1970s (Romero, 2006). This perma-
nent debate about lifting the ban on 
abortion mirrors a complex, multi-
faceted, and sensitive issue for Co-
lombian society. 
Abortion statistics in Colombia 
have always been seen as inaccu-
rate and debatable. The system of 
information is not reliable. yet, there 
are estimations of around 450,000 
abortions performed per year in 
Colombia despite its legal ban 
(Human Rights Watch, 2006). 
Some consider this number 
as an exaggeration promoted 
by abortion supporters to get the 
practice legalised in Colombia (Cath-
olics News Agency, 2005). Never-
theless, illegal and unsafe abortions 
bring about a high rate of complica-
tions and deaths every year (zamu-
dio, 1999). From the perspective of 
member of the Ministry of Health 
member, “the absolute [criminalisa-
tion] of abortion turns it into a public 
health matter and produces social 
inequality” and it is a serious threat 
to women’s health (González, 2005). 
Thus, a strong argument for legali-
sation is to protect women’s health 
and to avoid their exploitation in the 
practice of illegal abortions. 
The shift in the legal status of 
abortion in Colombia occurred as a 
new constitutional spirit came to the 
country after 1991. While the Constitu-
tion of 1886 was more paternalistic, 
for example, by giving to the Colombi-
ans the idea of good that one religion 
held, in the Constitution of 1991 Co-
lombia was defined as a “social state 
of rights […] democratic, participatory 
and pluralistic, founded on the respect 
for human dignity […]”14 (Constitución 
Política, 1991). The Constitution’s Title 
II, which includes five chapters, is de-
voted to the topic of rights. In fact, this 
has been called the constitution of the 
rights. Particularly important are the 
fundamental rights (Title II, Chapter 1), 
which were defined following the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Two creations of the Constitution of 
1991 are worth mentioning. First the 
tutelage action, an innovative legal tool 
through which any citizen can demand 
from the state that his/her fundamen-
tal rights are guaranteed and respect-
ed. Second, the Constitutional Court 
which has played an important role 
in assuring those fundamental rights 
to all the citizens. This Court decrimi-
nalised abortion in the cases afore-
mentioned after considering the argu-
ments of a Colombian female lawyer 
in 2005 (Romero, 2006). 
The claimant’s allegation was that 
a total ban on abortion was unconsti-
tutional since it violated constitution-
al fundamental rights. Her main argu-
ments were as follows: 1) women 
have the right to decide what can be 
done with/in their bodies, and this in-
cludes pregnancy; 2) if abortion is a 
medical procedure only practicable 
in women, its prohibition violates the 
right to equality; 3) human dignity is 
violated when the legislator imposes 
the pregnancy and it becomes a duty 
(e.g. cases of rape), constituting an 
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unconstitutional, cruel and degrading treatment for women; 
and 4) the right to life and health was also invoked for cases 
in which woman’s life is in danger because of pregnancy 
(Universidad Nacional, 2007: 47). 
In its decision, the Constitutional Court declared “the 
country’s blanket criminalization of abortion in violation of 
women’s constitutional rights” (Human Rights Watch, 2006). 
Apart from considering the claimant’s arguments, the Court 
balanced constitutional rights against social goods in its ratio 
decidendi15. Although the foetus has the status of being a 
“human life” to be constitutionally protected, this right to 
protection is not absolute. The total ban of abortion, argued 
the Court, imposed a disproportionate burden on women 
since they were obliged to complete the process of preg-
nancy. Furthermore, the Court took into account what was 
expressed in international treaties signed by Colombia. For 
example, CEDAW16, 1979 (no discrimination against women); 
the World Conference on Women, Cairo, 1995 (sexual and 
reproductive rights as human rights); and the Inter-American 
Convention of Human Rights, 1969. All of these treatises ad-
vocate safe abortion services as part of the sexual and re-
productive rights of women. Finally, the Constitutional Court 
also admitted the limits of the jurisprudence to decide on 
moral matters. Individuals can have different ethical view-
points and it would be inadmissible that a particular ethical 
vision was imposed by the state.
Four final things deserve to be mentioned about this 
legal decision. Firstly, the Court did not state “abortion-on-
demand” as the Colombian constitutional doctrine does not 
consider pregnancy a private issue. Indeed, all the decisions 
that a woman takes regarding her pregnancy have a social 
importance and, because of it, those decisions are of inter-
est to the state (Corte Constitucional, 2006). Secondly, the 
plurality of ethical visions coexisting in Colombian society 
was recognized and protected. In this way, doctors have 
the right to conscientious objection. Thirdly, the Court made 
clear that although abortion was a right and nobody could 
be obliged to perform it. And, fourthly, health care providers 
have the legal obligation to give their members, if request-
ed, safe, efficient and easily accessible abortion services. 
In this process, ethical arguments about abortion were 
taken into account by the Court not only by assessing their 
internal consistency, but also by their relationship with the 
golden rule, in this case, the Constitution. In the contem-
porary world, human rights and constitutions have come 
to work as a moral pattern. Whether this reality is accept-
able or not is another debate. Meanwhile, in the pluralistic 
society, politics and law solve those disagreements which 
were unsolvable in the moral field. If the target is that ev-
eryone is able to live his/her life in accordance with his/her 
particular ethical values, then politics and law are fulfilling 
that target. In the case of Colombia, in the same way that 
it has happened in other countries, what was guaranteed 
is a right to safe abortion. However, although this compro-
mise exists it is necessary to ask, why some groups insist 
on making their particular ethical commitments a moral 
rule for everyone It seems clear that this is because they 
do not understand the differences and possibilities of the 
distinction between ethics, politics and law.
Three years have passed since the historical decision 
to legalise abortion by the Colombian Court but abortion is 
still an endlessly debated moral issue.. While some contin-
ue insisting on the humanity of the foetus, others persist in 
advocating for women’s rights. Meanwhile, new challeng-
es have arisen due to difficulties implementing the new 
law. The Ministry of Social Protection have provided clear 
norms for implementing abortion services (Universidad 
Nacional, 2007). yet, there are growing criticisms because 
The shift in the legal status of abortion in Colombia occurred as 
a new constitutional spirit came to the country after 1991. While 
the Constitution of 1886 was more paternalistic, for example, 
by giving to the Colombians the idea of good that one religion 
held, in the Constitution of 1991 Colombia was defined as a 
“social state of rights […] democratic, participatory and plural-
istic, founded on the respect for human dignity […]”
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See, for example, the special edition of The Times on stem cell re-
search. It includes: Wright, J. “Rift grows as embryo laws nudge eth-
ical boundaries” and Murcott, T. “Status afforded to embryos is mis-
placed, says professor”. The Times. Focus Report (10 May 2008).
I shall use the term bioethics in the sense of the contemporary 
field where normative dimensions of biomedicine are discussed.
A simple definition of aporia is: “a difficulty, as in a philosophical or 
literary text, caused by an indeterminacy of meaning for which no 
resolution seems possible”. In: YourDictionary.com. (http://www.
yourdictionary.com/aporia) Accessed 22 May 2008.
It means the moment when foetal movements are felt by a 
woman, usually between 20 and 22 weeks in a primipara and 
around 16 weeks in a multipara.
See: Center for Reproductive Rights (2007) The World’s Abortions 
Laws. (http://www.reproductiverights.org/pub_fac_abortion_laws.
html) Accessed 4 May 2008.
See: Coates, S. & Bennett, R. (2008) “Tories signal new battleground 
as 24-week abortion limit survives”. The Times On Line, May 21 
(http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article3971930.ece). 
Accessed 25 May 2008.
In general, religions tend to disapprove of abortion. For a brief sum-
mary of the attitudes and beliefs of the leading religious groups in 
the United Kingdom to contraception see “Religion, contraception 
and abortion”. Pp. 1 – 3 in The abortion debate, vol. 126, edited by 
Craig Donellan. Cambridge: Independence, 2006.
NotES
of non-compliance with the law. Non-governmental orga-
nizations and the editorials of the main newspapers have 
expressed concerns about the persistence of illegal abor-
tions in Colombia since there are still several obstacles to 
access the service which women have to surmount17.
conclusIons
The practice of abortion and the moral debates that sur-
round it has existed for thousands of years. The develop-
ment of biomedicine during the second half of the twentieth 
century and the new ethical dilemmas it created menat that 
ethics has experienced a “re-flourishing”. Although abortion 
was an old topic, it began to be discussed widely as an im-
portant part of the new discipline of bioethics. New reflec-
tions on the power of biotechnology to intervene in life and 
new socio-political and cultural movements have contributed 
to increase the debate about abortion. In the battle for its de-
criminalisation the differences between various ethical con-
ceptions around abortion revealed radical and irreconcilable 
opinions: the pro-life position and the pro-choice position. 
This situation is expressed in academia as a continuous 
and endless production of ethical arguments, either for 
or against abortion. However, no one has demonstrat-
ed an argument that is purely conclusive.
Nevertheless, to live in pluralistic and multicultural 
societies requires a suitable solution to ethical disagree-
ments. This solution sometimes should be sought beyond 
those ethical theories in contest. Thus, I have argued for 
situating ethics as a part of the wider field of practical 
philosophy. In this way we can count on politics and law 
to manage ethical disagreements. As soon as we under-
stand abortion as an ethical-political-legal problem, solu-
tions coming from any part of this “symbiosis” can be 
conceived. The narrower idea which stipulates that ethi-
cal problems can only be solved by appealing to ethical 
theories is replaced by a broader conception in which 
ethical dilemmas admit political and legal solutions. As 
the main source of moral authority in the contemporary 
world seems to be the individual, this means that beyond 
good arguments or appeals to a particular idea of God we 
have to look for the consent of individuals. Therefore, the 
ethical rightness/wrongness of abortion has to be stated 
by the individuals in accordance to their particular values 
while politics and law specify limits to individual actions. 
The process of decriminalisation carried out in several 
countries in the last 40 years shows that the decision of 
abortion has been left in the individual’s hands. 
Even countries with a traditional opposition to abortion 
have adopted a pluralistic point of view via constitutional 
rights. This is the case of Colombia where a law that de-
criminalised abortion in three cases was stated after several 
parliamentary attempts in the last few decades. This shift 
can be seen as a result of both the new political constitu-
tion of 1991 and international pressures. Unlike the former 
constitution of 1886, the new Constitution sees Colombian 
society as multicultural, emphasising individuals’ rights, for 
example, about sexuality, conception and uses of the body. 
However, the Colombian constitutional court did not state 
abortion-on-demand since such an individual decision re-
garding abortion should be balanced against a defence of 
certain social goods. Thus, while the foetus is recognised 
as a “human life”, its rights cannot outweigh those of the 
woman, especially when her life is in danger, she did not 
consent the pregnancy (e.g. rape) or the pregnancy implies 
an “excessive” burden for her (e.g. the foetus is severely 
malformed). By and large, the position of the Colombian 
constitutional court can be seen as a middle position. 
In this context, bioethics can be a place to facilitate the 
dialogue that allows a wide social agreement to be reached. 
This position entails the distinction between ethics, politics 
and law. Moreover, it fundamentally requires that all the partic-
ipants in the debate are able to understand and accept that it 
is possible to live peacefully despite their ethical divergences.
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